ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

discharge the duties of his office," by granting permits for the removal
of distilled spirits from bonded warehouses in his district to bonded
warehouses in another district, without exacting transportation bonds
with sufficient sureties, in double the amount of taxes imposed on the
spirits, astrequired by the Act of June 30th 1864, sect. 61, and the
regulations of the treasury department. The evidence was that permits
had been given for the removal of nearly one thousanid barrels of whiskey, and on suing out the bond the sureties could not be found. No
residence was attached to their names on the bond, and in some cases
only the initials of their first names were given. The defence was that
defendant had relied on a clerk, and therefore could not be held on the
giound of negligence, and there was no evidence of corruption or any
dishonest purpose. The evidence, however, failed to show that the
clerk had been intrusted with the duty of examining the sufficiency of
the sureties, and in some instances the permits had been issued before
the bonds were handed to him. Under the charge of FIELD, J., the
jury found a verdict for the United States for $100,000, the full
amount of the defendant's bond.
J. T. MI.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

-Factors, who had agreed to insure property consigned'to them, effected
insurance to the amount of 41 per cent, only, and the property being
destroyed by fire, they wrote to the consignors conceding their liability
to account for all they had, receifed from the insurers, and placed the
amount to the credit of jhe consignors, hoping it would prove satisfactory. The consignors replied: "We supposed you were nearly insured
in full; but if this is all we are entitled to, we must submit." And
they drew a draft upon the factors for the amoupt received by them on
accbunt of insurance, which was paid: Held that, there being no dispute between the parties about the facts, or about the claim, this did
not amount to an accord and satisfaction: Beardsle et al. v. Davis, 52
Barb
AGREEMENT.

Acce.tance of Proposition.-To constitute an agreement, it is not
necessary that a proposition made by one party to 'another by letter,
should be accepted expressly. If it is acted upon, and complied with,
that is a sufficient acceptance: Beardsey et al. v. Davis, 52 Barb.
Thus, where the defendants, factors and produce commission merI From T. A. Post, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 43 Mo. Reports.
2 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol, 52 of his Reports.
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chants, addressed a letter to the plaintiffs, who were maltsters, soliciting
their business, or a continuance thereof, stating their terms and inviting
consignments of malt, and the plaintiffs, without replying to the letter,
or expressly accepting the proposition made therein, made several shipments of malt to the defendants: Held, that this was an acceptance of
the terms proposed; and that it was not material that the plaintiffs had
previously done business with the defendants without any knowledge
of their terms: Id.
Held, also, that on receiving such letter from the defendants,
stating that their charges for selling were 5 per cent., which covered all
expenses-insursne storage, &c, and a guaranty of the sales the plaintiffs were at liberty to withdraw their business, or continue it as they
pleased; and that the making of further shipments by them, after that,
was evidence that the terms were satisfactory, and that they were
accepted : Id.
Held, further, that these facts justified a finding by the referee, that
there was an agreement between the parties that the defendants should
cause the property of the plaintiffs to be insured: Id.
To Insure; Constructionof.-When an agreement-to insure is general, and there is no difficulty in procuring full insurance, and such is
the general practice in the particular matter embraced in the contract,
the fair and reasonable construction of the agreement is that the party
undertook to procure a contract for a full indemnity: Id. In the absence of any evidence, aside from the general agreement to
insure, the court, in fixing the amozunt of the insurance, would not, it
seems, stop short of a full insurance; unless it was shown that in the
particular matter or business it is not the practice to fully insure: Id.
Talidity.-A simple request, from one person to another, to do an act
from which the former can derive no sort of. benefit, made under an
entire misapprehension of his rights, does not constitute a lawful contract which is obligatory upon him: Wells v. Mann, 52 Barb.
Void within, the Statute of Frauds.-Where the defence of a suit
brought against A. upon a promissory note, is of no benefit to B., he not
being liable therein, a request from B. to A. to go on and defend the
suit if it can be considered a contract, is an independent promise on
the part of B. to answer for the debt of another, which he is not otherwise liable to pay; and if not in writing, is void within the Statute of
Frauds: Id.
ASSIGNMENT

FOR CREDITORS.

Attaching Creditorexcluded.-A creditor who attaches and sells the
goods of his debtor, after they have been assigned under the statute
for the benefit of all the creditors, will not be allowed to prove up his*
claim before the assignee, nor to avail himself of any of the benefits
of the assignment: Valentine v. Decker, 43 Mo.
ATTACHME.NT.

Garnislee.-Ifit appears that the contract of .a garnishee is to pay
in property, a judgment cannot be rendered against him as being
indebted to the defendant; unless there has been a demand and failure
to pay according to the contract: Weil v. Tyler, 43 Mo.
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Where set aside as irregular, no Potecton.-After an attachment,
under which goods have been seized, has been set aside as irregular, it
affords no shield or protection to the plaintiffs, for such taking. The
moment it is set aside, they stand as though no process had ever been
issued, and become trespassers ab initdo: Lyon v. Yates et al., 52 Barb.
Having taken the property as trespassers, they cannot, in an action
against them for the tort, show that they subsequently caused it to be
levied upon by virtue of a valid execution in their favor: Id.
BANKS.

Subscription for Stock.-Where, upon the organization of a bank,
individuals make and sign a certificate, stating that they have associated
themselves under and pursuant to the Act of 1838, to authorize the
business of banking, &o., which certificate contains the name of the
bank, &c., and is, in other respects, according to the requirements of
the statute, and declares that the subscribers have respectively subscribed and set their hands and seals, &c., and the number of shares
taken and held by each, and such numbers are affixed to the several
signatures; this, without any other subscription, is sufficient to render
the subscribers stockholders, and severally'liable to the bank to take
and pay for the number of shares set opposite each signature: Cole,
Receiver, &c. v. Ryan, 52 Barb.
Action by Receiver of Bank, to recover Subscr ton.-Where
i
one who
has agreed to iake stock, but has not paid for it, transfers the same in
good faith and without fraud, to an apparently responsible person, and
no debts of the bank existing at the time of such transfer, are outstanding at the timd a receiver of the bank is appointed, such receiver is
bound by the acts of the bank in recognising the transferee as the owner
of the stock and the debtor thereon; and cannot maintain an action
against the transferor to recover the amount of his subscription for the
stock: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Gambling-Evi&dence of.-The defendant was found with others
around a card-table, with a faro-box and cards in his hands. Checks
and money passed between them. No rebutting testimony. Held that
this evfdence was sufficient to warrant a conviction for gambling: .Missouri v. Andrews, 43 Mo.
DAMAGES.

Measure of.-In an action against an agent for negligence, in not
procuring full insurance, the measure of damages is the value of the
property destroyed; to be reduced by any amount received under a partial insurance: Beardsley et al.v. Davis, 52 Birb.
EJECTMENT.

Evidence of Title.-In an action of ejectment, prior possession, accompanied with a claim of the fee, raises a presumptioi of title; and is
sufficient to sustain an ejectment against one who shows only naked
possession: Dale v. Faivre, 43 Mo.
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EXECUTION.

Exempt P.roperty; Burden of Proof.-Where, in an action against
a constable, for returning an execution unsatisfied, when it might have
been collected, the question arises whether certain property of the defendant in the execution was exempt from levy or sale, the affirmative
is with the officer claiming the exemption. T.rimdfacie all property is
"liable to execution: Baker v. Brintnall,52 Barb.
Exemption is a statutory privilege, and is strictly personal. It therefore will not avail an officer sued for neglect of duty in not levying on
property: Id.
The question 'ofexemption being one that a constable cannot raise in
his defence, when sued for not levying and selling, his acceptance
of the execution, and a bond of indemnity, with his consent to act upon
the execution, and his action so far as to take an inventory of the propirty of the defendant in the execution, estops him, in law, from returning the execution unsatisfied: Id.
If he is not satisfied with the bond of indemnity he should refuse it.
Having accepted it, he is bound to go on and act as instructed: Id.
INSURANCE.

Assiqnmenwt of Pol(q.-A policy of insurance was issued to John
Franklin, payable to P. H. French. After loss French assigned
to the Union Savings Association, and the latter assigned to John
Franklin. In an action on the policy by Franklin as assignee of
French, it was held that French as payee of the policy had a sufficient
interest in the contract to sustain the validity of the policy. It is to be
regarded in the same light as if assigned at its inception to French with
the consent of the company: Franklinv. National Is. Go., 43 Mo.
Subsequent Insurance.-A policy of insurance contained the usual
stipulation requiring notice and endorsement upon the policy or
acknowledgment in writing of all previous and subsequent insurances,
in default of which the policy should cease and be of no effect.
Held that a subsequent temporary insurance effected after the issuing
of the policy, without notice, but not existing at the time of the loss,
did not avoid the policy under this stipulation: Obermeyer v. Globe hIs.
Co., 43 Mo.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
Docket.-Although the statute directs that every justice shall keepa
book called a docket, and also directs what entries he shall make therein, the omission, by a justice, so to keep his book will not render his
judgment void. Proceedings before him can still be proved by himself: Baker v. Brintnall,52 Barb.
For certain purposes, the docket fails to be evidence, if not kept as the
statute directs, but the omission so to keep it is not jurisdictional: Id.
JUSTICE'S COURT.

Jurisdictionof the Person.-Where a defendant, sued by long summons in a justice's court, in a different county from that in which he
resided, appeared by attorney and put in an answer, the attorney stating

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

that the defendant resided in another county, but he did not plead that
fact, nor would he make an affidavit of it: Held, that the defendant, by
answering, waived any defence on the ground of residence, and thus
gave the justice jurisdiction of his person:' Osburne v. GCrbert, 52 Barb.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES.
Where a bond was conditioned to pay "in gold or silyer coin of the
standard by which the coins of the United States were regulated by
the laws existing on the 26th Jay of MIay 1846, the sum of $4000,"
in three years, with interest: Held, that the bond, and a mortgage
given in connection therewith, were paid and satisfied by a payment
in, legal tender notes: Murray v. Gale, adm'x., &c., 52 Barb.
LIMITATIONS.

Special Act.-Action upon notes issued by the Kirksville branch of
the Bank of St. Louis. By the Act of February 16th 1864, provisions
were made for winding up the branch banks throughout the state. In
this act it was provided that all claims, dues, and demands against said
banks not presented within two years, should be for ever barred, saving
the usual disabilities. Held that this special limitation was legal, and
that the notes in suit not being presented within the two years were
barred: Stevens v. St. Louis National Bank, 43 Mo.
MARRIED WO -N.

Actions by.-Since the acts of the legislature, of 1860, chap. 90, and
of 1862, chap. 172, a married woman may bring an action in her own
name against a wrong-doer, for a wrong committed, upon her -person,
without joining her husband with her as a party: Ball v. Bullard, 52
Barb.
To the damages which are recoverable for a personal injury to the
wife, committed previous to the statute of 1860, the husband has no
vested or other interest or right, legal or natural. Hence there is no
ground for making him a party to an action therefor: Id.
As to the right to bring such an 'action, the statute of 1860 makes a
married woman a feme sole. By suing as a feme sole, she accepts its
provisions, and takes it subject to its letter, its spirit and intent, limitations and liabilities: Id.
And treating her as a feme sole, with the disability removed, the
Statute of Limitations applies to the case, and if the action is not brought
within one year, nor within six years, after the removal of her disability
to sue, by the Act of 1860, it will be barred: Id."
NEGLIGENCE.

Adjoining Tenants.-The occupatit of a second story is liable for the
negligence of his sertants in allowing a hydrant to flood the story below,
and damage thd goods of the occupant of said story: Gass v. Callunry, 43 No.
Contributing to the Injury.-The n~gligence of the deceased, in order.
to defeat an action in favor of his widow for the injury causing his
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death, must be direct and proximate in contributing.to'the injury; and
an instruction referring to negligence generally was properly refused:
Meyqer v. People's Railwai,43 Mo.
Evidence.-In an action against an overseer of highways, for causing
embankments or breaks to be-made across the road, on a hill, whereby
the plaintiff was thrown from his wagon and injured, evidence to show
that within a week of the time of the accident, a person was upset at
the same place, and a lady was thrown out of a wagon; and that about
the time or within two or three months of the plaintiff's injury, several
accidents of a similar kind occurred from the same cause at the place in
question, is not admissible: Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb.
Where, in such an action, the plaintiff alleged, in one count of his
complaint, that the defendant was fully informed and knew of the danger of the embankments placed by him upon the highway, and that.he
oilfufly and wrongfully persisted in erecting and maintaining them
across the highway: Beld, that an issue being raised as to the defendant's malice and intentions, it was not erroneous to permit him to prove
that he had no malice or ill will, or intention to injure the plaintiff: Id.
NUISANCE.

Action against Continuer of.-Every continuance of a nuisance is,
in judgment of law, a fresh nuisance. An action can be maintained
against the party continuing the nuisance; whether he be the original
wrong-doer, or his alienee: The Conhocton Stone Company v. The
Buffalo, New York and Erie Railroad Company, 52 Barb.
Although a corporation erecting or continuing a nuisance had leased
the premises on which the same was erected to another, and given possession prior to the happening of an injury occasioned by it, it is liable
for the damages sustained : Id.
An action for damages will lie against the continuer of a nuisance,
without averring or proving a previous notice to him, of the existence
and extent of the nuisance, and a request to abate and remove it:. Id.
PRINCIPAL ANI AGENT.

Duty of Agent to his Principal.-An agent, while in his principal's
employ, can accept no employment hostile to the interest of his employer.
If he does so, and receives remuneration therefor, it constitutes a breach
of the contract between him and the company, and affords good and
sufficient ground for his discharge. Nor can an agent act in the business of his agency, for himself and his principal at the same time:
Morrison v. The Ogdensburgh and Lake Chanplain Railroad Cormp any, 52 Barb.
Thus, an .individual employed by a railroad company, as its agent, to
purchase wood and timber for its use, has no right, while purchasing
woodland for the company, as such agent, to receive from the vendor a
commission for promoting the sale. And if the company is compelled,
through the agent's neglect of duty, to pay more for the land than it
otherwise would have paid, the difference, being the amount of the
agent's commissions, in equity belongs to the company: Id.
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SALE.
Passing of Title to Personalty.-The defendants agreed to furnish
the plaintiff's intestate with tobacco of a certain grade, and at a fixed
price per pound, for resale by the latter. The plaintiff's testimony
tended to show that the tobacco was to be paid for "when sold", by the
said intestate, the defendant's testimony tended to show that payment
was to be made at "the end of the month" in which the tobacco was
delivered, and if not resold by the said intestate at that time, then payment might be made another month. Under this state of circumstances
the defendants delivered to said intestate 940 pounds of tobacco at the
agreed price. Sales of it were made amounting to $318, when the store
of said intestate was consumed by fire and the residue of the tobacco
destroyed. At a subsequent date the plaintiff's clerk paid the defendants the full amount of the tobacco, having no knowledge of the nature
of the transaction. This suit was brought to recover $622, the amount
of the over-payment. Held that the transaction was a sale of the
tobacco, and that the title passed at the time of delivery, and that an
instruction referring the consummation of the sale to the time of payment after resale was erroneous: Blow, adm'r. v. Spear et aL, 43 Mo.
TAXATON.
Special Tax Bills.-Under the charter of St. Louis city the cost of
sewers may be assessed as a tax against the adjoining property. This
assessment is made by the city engineer, who apportions it as a special
tax against the property, and certifies in the form of special tax bills,
the amount against each lot. The charter requires that this assessment
shall be "against each lot," in the name of the owner. In an action to
enforce one of these tax bills as a lien against the property, it was held
that the clause as to ownership was only directory, and that the assessment against the lot was not vitiated by an error in respect to the
ownership. An assessment against the lot of E. B. H. de Nou6, who
owned it in her separate right, was valid, although made out in the
name of L. de Nou6 her husband: City, of St. Louis to use of Rotchford v. De Nou et al., 43 Mo.
Under the same charter, a special tax bill for the construction' of a
sewer is properly assessed in the name of Mrs. Bernondy, she being the
beneficiary of the lot, although the naked legal title was held in the
name of Mr. Garesche for her use and benefit. There would be no law
for rendering a personal judgment against Mr. Garesehe. Nor could a
personal judgment be rendered against Mrs. Bernondy, she being a
married lady. The tax could be enforced only as a'special lien against
her separate estate: Creamer v. Bernondy et al., 43 Mo.
of.-By the Act of February 1865, it
State Income Tax-egay
was provided that a tax of 2 per cent. upon incomes should be collected
for the year 1865. ' It was also provided that the assessment should be
based upon the amount of income received in the year next preceding
the time of assessment. Held that an assessment fcr the year 1865,
upon the amount of income received in the year ending March 31st

